We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce pro…ts and raise share prices. If it is better to be an "insider" than an "outsider," …rms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value of the insiders is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also explain why shareholders of targets gain while acquirers typically break even. These results are derived in an endogenous-merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared.
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) may improve the performance of …rms through better exploitation of scale economies and increased market power, but they can also increase the burdens of bureaucracy and create cultural clashes and thus degrade the operating performance. To discern whether the balance of e¤ects is favorable, comprehensive econometric analysis is necessary. The large literature aiming at quantitatively measuring M&A performance has employed two main approaches which yield con ‡icting results.
The so-called event studies investigate how the stock market values the merger when it is announced by comparing the share prices a few weeks before and after the event. Even though there are numerous event studies, their results are consistent. The shareholders of the target …rms bene…t, and those of the bidding …rms generally break even. The combined gains are mainly positive. 1 The second strand of the literature compares accounting pro…ts a few years before and after the transaction. A robust result is that mergers lead to a significant reduction in the merging …rms' pro…tability compared to a control sample of …rms from various industries. Surveys typically conclude that, on average, mergers are unpro…table. 2 If all empirical evidence is correct, we are left with three puzzles: Why do unpro…table M&As occur? How can the value of …rms increase when pro…ts are reduced? Why do some …rms volunteer as buyers when the targets capture the 1 The early literature was surveyed by Jensen and Ruback (1983) , and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) . It contained some debate concerning the e¤ect of merger on the aggregate value of the merging …rms. Later contributions indicate more clearly that this e¤ect is positive, see for example Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) , Stulz, Walking and Song (1990) , Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) , Huston and Ryngaert (1994) , Schwert (1996) , and Banerjee and Eckard (1998) .
2 See for example Bild (1998) , Caves (1989) and Scherer and Ross (1990) . There is also complementary evidence of di¢culties associated with mergers, emphasizing that the strategic potentials of mergers are not automatically realized. Organization research points at the role of cultural clashes. The human resource management literature indicates that acquired company employees may react unfavorably to M&As. For a survey and synthesis of these literatures, see Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) . whole stock market surplus? This paper attempts to resolve these puzzles by proposing a single explanation for all the stylized facts.
An unpro…table merger may occur if mergers confer strong negative externalities on the …rms outside the merger. If it is better to become an "insider" than an "outsider," …rms may rationally merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. Expressed di¤erently, even if a merger reduces the pro…t ‡ow compared to the initial situation, it may increase this ‡ow compared to the relevant alternative -in this case, another merger.
Even though a preemptive merger reduces pro…ts, the aggregate value of the …rms (the discounted sum of expected future pro…ts) is increased. The reason is that the …rms' pre-merger value takes the risk that they may become outsiders into account. Under the hypothesis that the stock market is e¢cient (in the sense that share prices re ‡ect the values of …rms) our results demonstrate that the two strands of the empirical literature may be consistent. In particular, the event studies can be interpreted as showing the existence of an industry-wide anticipation of a merger; the new information in the merger announcement is what …rms become insiders and outsiders, respectively.
Even though the aggregate value of the merging …rms is increased, on average buyers only break even. Nevertheless, …rms do not just wait to become targets, since they are afraid of becoming outsiders. Instead, they compete to buy other …rms and, as a result, buyers give up the whole surplus to targets, much like in Bertrand competition. In fact, the buyer's share price is even reduced with positive probability.
The empirical result that mergers reduce pro…ts is obtained in studies using control …rms from various industries. When compared to control …rms from the same industry, the results are mainly insigni…cant but favor the merging sample.
The preemptive merger hypothesis also provides a possible explanation for why control groups matter. If the control …rms compete with the insiders, they are exposed to externalities from the merger. Then, the change in relative pro…tabil-ity is a biased measure of the change in the insiders' pro…tability. If the merger induces a positive (negative) externality, the change in relative pro…tability underestimates (over-estimates) the change in pro…tability. In particular, preemptive mergers increase the merging …rms' pro…tability relative to competitors, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Increased relative pro…tability should thus not be taken as proof that mergers create value.
To describe the acquisition process, we construct an extensive form model of coalitional bargaining. 3 In particular, we construct a so-called game of timing. 4 Any …rm can submit a merger proposal to any other …rm at any point in time and the recipient of a proposal can either accept or reject it. In the latter case, …rms can make new proposals in the future. As a consequence, …rms endogenously decide whether and when to merge, and how to split the surplus while keeping alternative mergers in mind.
The model is presented in the next section. Section 3 demonstrates why mergers may reduce pro…ts and raise share prices, Section 4 shows why control groups matter in pro…t studies and Section 5 explains why targets take it all.
Implications for merger policy and future empirical work are spelled out in Section 6 and the Concluding Remarks, respectively. The related literature is discussed in appropriate places throughout the paper.
The Model
We consider an industry which initially consists of three identical …rms. If they wish, any two …rms may merge and turn the market into a duopoly. Mergers to 3 The idea to use the theory of coalition formation for studying mergers originates in Stigler (1950) . The …rst formal models were studied by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983, section IV) , and Deneckere and Davidson (1985b) . More recent contributions include Kamien and Zang (1990 , 1991 , Persson (2001a, 2001b) and Gowrisankaran (1999) . 4 Games of timing have previously been used for studying preemption, including patent races (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz, and Tirole, 1983) , the adoption of new technology (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) , compatibility standards (Farrell and Saloner, 1988) and entry (Bolton and Farrell, 1990). monopoly are illegal, however.
In the spirit of Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining, the acquisition process is modelled as a multi-stage (three-person) bargaining game with an in…nite horizon. In every period, all …rms simultaneously have the possibility to submit one bid each for some other …rm. If more than one …rm bids, only one bid is transmitted, all with equal probability.
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A …rm receiving a bid can either accept or reject it.
In all periods before an agreement, all three …rms earn the triopoly pro…t, ¼ (3).
Once a merger from triopoly to duopoly occurs, the bargaining ends. In every subsequent period, the merged and the outsider …rms earn ¼ (2
The model aims at capturing frictionless communication in the sense that …rms can make o¤ers quickly. For this reason, it is convenient to assume that time is continuous but divided into short periods of length ¢ and study the model as ¢ ! 0. The pro…t parameters must then be interpreted as continuous-time pro…t ‡ows. Furthermore, we assume that merger proposals and replies are given at the very beginning of every period, without taking any time. For the remainder of the period (thus taking time ¢) the …rms earn pro…t ‡ows corresponding to the prevailing market structure. For example, if the triopoly survives the negotiations in the …rst period, all …rms will earn
the second-period bidding starts, where r is the interest rate.
7 5 This is a simple and transparent way of circumventing a well-known problem. Preemption games give rise to technical di¢culties if all players decide to move immediately. In our model, the …rms may agree on mutually inconsistent contracts. Other solutions to this problem are discussed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 126-8) . Our assumption can be considered in terms of a continuous time model with bounded bidding densities. In that case, the probability that two …rms bid at the same time is zero. Moreover, if all …rms bid with the same density, they are all equally likely to be …rst. 6 In Section 5, we explore the alternative assumption that the highest bid is transmitted. 7 The alternative is to assume that time is discrete, and to study the model as the discount factor ± tends to one. The disadvantage of this approach is that …rms' stock market values would tend to in…nity as ± tends to one (holding per-period pro…ts constant). To avoid normalizing …rms' stock market values to per-period units, as is often done in repeated games, one may instead let ± = e ¡r¢ and de…ne the per-period pro…ts as e ¼ = ¡ 1 ¡ e ¡ r¢ ¢ ¼=r. In fact, this solution is equivalent to our formulation. Normally, a merger also confers an externality on the outsider. Since a merger reduces the number of competitors, there is a positive market power e¤ect so Figure 1 , this possibility is illustrated as the area on the right-hand side of ¼ (3) on the x-axis. However, if the merging parties can re-duce their marginal costs substantially, they become a more di¢cult competitor, which may harm outsiders, so that ¼ (2 ¡ ) < ¼ (3). In Figure 1 , this possibility is illustrated as the area on the left-hand side of ¼ (3) on the x-axis. Furthermore, in many cases, the externality is strong in the sense that the e¤ect on the outsider's pro…t is larger than the e¤ect on the insiders' pro…ts, that is
Area D represents markets where a merger is unpro…table, and even more unpro…table to the outsider. Area B represents markets where a merger is pro…table, but even more pro…table to the outsider.
In the following analysis, we show that the incentives to merge di¤er a great deal between the di¤erent areas A, B, C and D.
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A strategy describes a …rm's behavior in the multi-stage bargaining game. For all periods and for all possible histories, the strategy speci…es whether and how much to bid, and a reservation price at which to accept o¤ers. We restrict the attention to Markov strategies, which means that …rms do not condition their behavior on the outcome of previous periods. This assumption implies that a …rm behaves in the same way in all periods. We also restrict the attention to symmetric equilibria. These assumptions allow us to illustrate the preemptive merger mechanism in the simplest possible framework. A symmetric Markov 9 Rather than specifying an explicit oligopoly model, we take all pro…t levels in all market structures, that is (¼ (3) ; ¼ (2 + ) ; ¼ (2 ¡ )), as exogenous. All possible pro…t con…gurations in Figure 1 can be generated by means of a simple oligopoly model, however. Consider a linear homogenous good Cournot triopoly. Inverse demand is given by p = 1 ¡ q 1 ¡ q 2 ¡ q 3 . The common constant marginal cost is c. Equilibrium quantities are q = (1 ¡ c) =4 and equilibrium pro…ts are ¼ (3) = (1 ¡ c) 2 =16. Assume now that one …rm buys another and that, as a result, the marginal cost of the merged …rm is reduced to zero and a …xed cost f has to be taken. The …xed cost may be thought of as including annuity payments of one-time costs of restructuring. The equilibrium pro…ts are given by ¼ (2
The merger is privately pro…table if, and only if, f < ¡ c 2 . Assume …rst that c = 0:1, so that there is a …xed positive externality. When f is very high, the merger is unpro…table (region A). When f is moderately high, the merger is pro…table, but it is better to be an outsider (region B). When f is small, it is better to be an insider than an outsider (region C). Second, assume that c = 0:3, so that there is a …xed negative externality. When f is very high, being an insider even worse (region A). When f is moderately high, the merger is unpro…table, but it is better to be an insider than an outsider (region D). When f is low, the merger is pro…table (region C). perfect equilibrium is characterized by the triple (p; b; a), where p 2 [0; 1=2] denotes the probability of a …rm bidding for a speci…c …rm in a given period (given that the triopoly remains in that period), b denotes the size of this bid, and a denotes the lowest bid a target accepts.
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For convenience, only bids that would be accepted if submitted are considered.
We assume that the stock market is e¢cient in the sense that the stock market value of a …rm equals the expected discounted sum of future pro…ts. It is also assumed that …rms distribute the surplus in every period as dividends. The next step is to compute these values at di¤erent points in time, namely after a merger has occurred, at the date of a merger and before a merger. After a merger to duopoly, the stock market values of the merged …rm (+) and the outsider …rm (-) are given by
where ¼ (2 i ) =r is the discounted value of all future pro…ts. At the time when a merger occurs, the values of the buying, selling, and outsider …rms are given by
respectively. In the triopoly, the stock market value of any …rm is given by
The …rst term is the value generated by the triopoly in the current period, the second term is the discounted expected value of all future pro…ts. In particular, the value of being a buyer (seller, outsider, triopolist) in the next period is 10 Firm 1's strategy can be described by the
¤¢ where, for example, p 1 2 denotes the probability with which …rm 1 bids for …rm 2, and h denotes history. The Markov assumption implies that the …rm does not condition its behavior on h. Symmetry means that …rm 1 treats both competitors in the same way implying, for example, that p 1 2 = p 1 3´p
1 . Symmetry also means that all …rms behave in the same way, implying that
multiplied by the probability of becoming a buyer (seller, outsider, triopolist) in that period. By de…nition, q is the probability of a speci…c …rm buying another speci…c …rm. It is given by:
The stock market value of …rms are changed as a result of the merger. Initially the buying …rm is worth W (3) and at the announcement date it is worth V buy .
Likewise, the aggregate value of the merging …rms is 2W (3) at every date before the merger and W (2
Firms maximize their expected discounted sums of future pro…ts, which is equivalent to maximizing the current stock market value of the …rm. To formulate the equilibrium conditions, using the one stage deviation principle, we de…ne the Three equilibrium conditions complete the model. Without loss of generality, we restrict the attention to one-stage deviations.
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First, by subgame perfection, an o¤er is accepted if, and only if, the bid is at least as high as the value of the 11 To write q as a function of p, note that q = (1 ¡ q 0 ) =6, where q 0 is the probability of remaining in status quo, and that q 0 = (1 ¡ 2p) 3 , which is the probability that no …rm makes a bid. The status quo only remains if no …rms submit a bid, since all bids are designed to be accepted. 12 The game is continuous at in…nity so that the one-stage deviation principle holds (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . …rm, 13 that is
Second, for the bidder to maximize its value, the bid should be as low as possible, that is
The third equilibrium condition is that …rms submit bids if, and only if, this is pro…table:
Immediate-merger: p = 
We are mainly interested in situations where all …rms bid with certainty in all periods, that is, in immediate-merger equilibria. To understand the logic behind such equilibria, the …rst step is to focus on the …rms' choice of bidding probabilities. Consider a …rm whose competitors stick to their equilibrium strategies,
i.e. bidding with certainty (p = 1=2). Then, the …rm's expected value of bidding (that is, sticking to the equilibrium) is given by EV B = 1 3
since a merger will then occur with certainty and since an individual …rm will become a buyer, a seller or an outsider with equal probability. Moreover, when the competitors bid with certainty, the …rm's expected value of not bidding (that is a one-stage deviation) is given by EV NB = 1 2
still occurs with certainty and since the deviating …rm will become a seller or an outsider with equal probability. Thus, bidding with certainty is a best reply to competitors bidding with certainty if, and only if, V buy¸1 2
13 The shareholders of a target are treated as a single individual. This is a reduced form both for statutory mergers (where shareholders vote), and for tender o¤ers (where shareholders make independent decisions). For a statutory merger to be approved, at least some fraction ® must vote for accepting the proposal. In the voting game, it is a weakly dominating strategy for a shareholder to vote for acceptance if b > W (3), and to vote for rejection otherwise. In a tender o¤er, the buyer must acquire at least a fraction¯of the target …rm's shares in order to control this …rm. Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) show that if b > W (3), there exist equilibria where exactly this fraction¯is tendered.
This condition can also be written as
is to use the fact that the stock market is e¢cient. When all …rms bid with certainty (so that p = 1=2 and q = 1=6), the stock market value of a triopoly …rm is W (3) = (W (2
Thus, in an immediate-merger equilibrium
In sum, there is an equilibrium where all …rms bid with certainty (p = 1=2) and have the stock market value
if, and only if, ¼ (2
The complete equilibrium structure is presented and formally proved in Lemma 1 of Appendix B. Figure 1 summarizes the Lemma by illustrating the parameter con…gurations under which the di¤erent types of equilibria exist. There exists a no-merger equilibrium if, and only if, the merger is unpro…table [¼ (2
illustrated as areas A and D. There exists an immediate-merger equilibrium if, and only if, it is better to be an insider than an outsider [¼ (2
lustrated as areas C and D. There exists a delayed-merger equilibrium if, and only if, mergers are pro…table but being an outsider is even more pro…table
, illustrated as area B, or mergers are unpro…table but being an outsider is even more unpro…table [¼ (2
illustrated as area D. Hence, there exists an equilibrium for all points in the parameter space.
In area D, all three types of equilibria exist. For the sake of the argument, we select the immediate-merger equilibrium, which is the equilibrium yielding predictions replicating the stylized facts from the empirical literature.
14 Finally, we should mention an extension of the model. Assume that …rms are 14 Standard selection arguments do not o¤er clear-cut results. The no-merger equilibrium Pareto-dominates the immediate-merger equilibrium. Hence, if the …rms can make an agreement not to merge, and be fully con…dent that this agreement is followed, the reasonable prediction is that unpro…table mergers do not occur. On the other hand, risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) points at the immediate-merger equilibrium (see Fridolfsson and Stennek, 2000) . asymmetric and that one merger is pro…table while the other two are unpro…table.
Then, the immediate-merger equilibrium is unique (Fridolfsson, 2001) . Since one merger is pro…table, a no-merger equilibrium does not exist. Moreover, in the immediate-merger equilibrium, unpro…table mergers occur with strictly positive (sometimes high) probability. Intuitively, if the negative externality from the pro…table merger is large, some …rms have an incentive to preempt this merger.
The Preemptive Merger Hypothesis
The condition for a merger to immediately occur is not that it is pro…table; rather, it is that it is better to be an insider than an outsider. Expressed di¤erently, if one …rm has an incentive to merge, then (in our symmetric setting) so do the other …rms. Thus, the relevant alternative to a merger is not status quo, but another merger. As a direct consequence of Lemma 1:
Proposition 1 Unpro…table mergers may occur in equilibrium, if being an outsider is even more disadvantageous.
To make the preemptive (or defensive) merger hypothesis more concrete, we supply an example why a merger may be unpro…table for the merging …rms, and even more unpro…table for the outsider.
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Consider a horizontal merger. If the merger generates important marginal cost synergies, the outsiders will lose; if it is costly to arrange, the insiders may lose. 16 Both conditions deserve to be commented upon. First, in a homogenous good oligopoly, marginal cost savings must be substantial for a merger to reduce the price and thus harm competitors (Farrell and 15 A preemptive merger mechanism has also been demonstrated by Horn and Persson (2001b) , using a cooperative game theory model. They study an international oligopoly and the so-called tari¤-jumping argument according to which international mergers are more likely than domestic mergers, since the former saves on trade costs. Horn and Persson show, however, that domestic …rms may agree to (a pro…table) merger to preempt international mergers that would sti¤en the competition in the home market. Nilssen and Sorgard (1998) discuss the preemption motive in an exogenous merger model. 16 This example is formalized in footnote 7 above, assuming that the …xed cost f includes annuity payments of the one-time cost of restructuring. Shapiro, 1990) . For instance, a pure reallocation of production between plants is not su¢cient; some synergy is required, for example, due to complementary patents. On a market with spatially di¤erentiated products, on the other hand, synergies are not required for a merger to hurt competitors (Boyer, 1992) . Second, the one-time costs of restructuring can indeed be substantial, for example due to problems of fusing di¤erent company cultures. As an example, the cost of the merger between Pharmacia and Upjohn was estimated to 1.6 billion dollars for the period 1995-97, as a contrast to the equity value of 5.5 billion dollars (A¤ärsvärlden, 1998) .
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There are several cases illustrating that preemption is sometimes the primary motive behind one …rm's acquisition of the control rights of another. Northwest Airline acquired 51 percent of the voting rights in Continental Airline, but agreed not to use its voting stake to interfere in the management of Continental for six years; it has only reserved the right to block mergers (The Economist, 1998) . A more recent example is Volvo's attempted acquisition of Scania. Håkan Frisinger, the chairman of the board of Volvo, con…rmed that the primary motive behind the attempted transaction was to preempt other …rms with an interest in Scania (Dagens Nyheter, 1999) . 18 We should emphasize that we do not claim these two mergers to be unpro…table; that we do not know. These cases only illustrate that strategic motives, and preemption in particular, are important for merger incentives in the real world. Our results show that, in principle, strategic motives may be so strong so as to induce …rms to agree to unpro…table mergers.
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A preemptive merger also a¤ects the merging …rms' share prices. In fact, all unpro…table mergers that occur in equilibrium increase the combined value of the merging …rms [W (2 + ) > 2W (3)]. Assuming that share prices re ‡ect the sum of the discounted expected future pro…ts:
Proposition 2 Unpro…table mergers occurring in equilibrium increase the combined stock market value of the merging …rms.
The proof is straightforward. Consider the case of an immediate and unprofitable merger. Such an equilibrium exists if ¼ (2
. Furthermore, the pre-and post-merger stock market values are given by W (2
, which is true.
Intuitively, the pre-merger value of a merging …rm, W (3), is low since it re ‡ects the risk of the …rm becoming an outsider. This result demonstrates that the empirical studies based on share prices and pro…t ‡ows may be consistent.
In particular, we may interpret the event studies as showing the existence of an industry-wide anticipation of a merger; the new information in the merger announcement is what …rms are insiders and outsiders, respectively.
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Proposition 2 thus shows that rising share prices should not be taken as proof that a merger creates value, since share prices and pro…ts may go in opposite directions. This result, however, depends crucially on the stock market being competitor without integrating the …rms) is not always an option, however. Once the competitor has been bought, the buyer may, in fact, have an incentive to integrate the …rms. To see this, …rst note that an owner's decision to delegate management need not be credible. The owner certainly wants to internalize price and output decisions among his …rms. This is also understood by the competitors. Hence, joint ownership may entail joint pricing and output determination. Second, once the price and quantity decisions are coordinated, the owner may also want to integrate the production processes. For example, attaining variable cost synergies, at the expense of increased …xed costs (or costs associated with the integration), may be a strategically pro…table "top dog" strategy (Fridolfsson and Stennek,1999 ; Example 1). 20 The e¤ect of mergers on share prices may be quite large according to the model. The increase in the aggregate value of the insiders ranges from zero to 50 percent, and the reduction in the value of the outsider ranges from zero to 100 percent, depending on the exact location of the market in Figure 1. e¢cient. Assume that the stock market does not understand the equilibrium of the merger formation game, and does not foresee an upcoming merger. Assume, in particular, that the stock market expects the triopoly to continue forever. The pre-merger value of the …rms is then given by f W (3) = ¼ (3) =r. Consequently, the evolution of the stock market value of the merging …rms, from 2 f W (3) to W (2 + ) = ¼ (2 + ) =r does re ‡ect the pro…tability of the merger. Hence, in order to correctly interpret event study evidence, it is important to empirically discriminate between the e¢cient market (anticipation) hypothesis and the surprise hypothesis.
The preemptive merger hypothesis also has a residual implication, namely that the outsider's value decreases, that is, W (2 ¡ ) < W (3). Unfortunately, the available evidence on this point is not conclusive. Stillman (1983) …nds no statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the outsiders' share prices while Eckbo (1983) …nds a statistically signi…cant increase. However, the latter study is also inconclusive;
in those cases where the competition authorities announce an investigation of the merger, there is no signi…cant e¤ect on the outsiders' share prices. Schumann (1993) con…rms this pattern. The most favorable evidence for the preemption hypothesis has been produced by Banerjee and Eckard (1998) . They show that during the Great Merger Wave of 1897 -1903 the competitors su¤ered signi…cant value losses.
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The previous literature contains several other explanations why unpro…table mergers occur. Roll (1986) argues that those managers that overestimate their ability (or pro…t opportunities in general) most, are also most likely to buy a target …rm. Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that managers have other motives than value maximization, such as the size of their organization, while Fauli-Oller and Motta (1996) argue that unpro…table mergers are a side e¤ect of strategic dele- 21 Banerjee and Eckard also report small drifts in the share prices for two months before the merger event. The insiders' values are increased (although economically insigni…cantly). The outsiders' values are reduced (although statistically insigni…cantly). These movements are consistent with the preemptive merger cum anticipation hypothesis if the stock market already expects a merger, and if it is membership information that is leaking in the last two months.
gation. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that, provided that the buyer has a high book-to-market value before the merger, a large number of merged …rms underperform on the stock market in the …rst three years after the merger. To explain their …ndings, they suggest that the market (not only the management) systematically over-extrapolates the past performance of successful managers. All these hypotheses (hubris, empire-building, strategic delegation, over-extrapolation and preemption) may contribute to a full understanding of why unpro…table mergers occur. The two latter may also explain why share prices are increased.
On the Construction of Control Groups in Pro…t Studies
The empirical evidence suggests that most M&A activity is due to identi…able shocks, examples of which are deregulation, factor price changes, foreign competition and technological innovations (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) . Although we have not emphasized this point earlier, our model should also be interpreted as mergers being associated with shocks. Immediate (or delayed) mergers must occur immediately (or some time) after the current market conditions were settled.
Before that, the initial market structure (triopoly) was stable, i.e. in a no-merger equilibrium.
This association of mergers with changes in external conditions creates an identi…cation problem; the e¤ect of the merger on pro…ts and share prices must be separated from the e¤ect of the shocks. The identi…cation problem is probably not severe in event studies; since they compare share prices a few weeks before and after the announcement, they are not likely to capture the direct e¤ect of the shock. Therefore, the model builds on the assumption that the shock has already occurred before the beginning of the merger game. Expressed di¤erently, the pre-merger value of …rms, that is W (3), should be interpreted as a …rm's value after the e¤ects of the shock have been incorporated into the share prices, but before a possible (and anticipated) merger occurs. Note, however, that this requires "immediate" mergers to be interpreted as mergers undertaken "as fast as possible," allowing for inevitable administrative delay.
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The identi…cation problem is likely to be severe in the accounting pro…t studies, however. Since these studies must be extended for several years around the transaction, they are likely to include the event triggering the merger. To control for exogenous shocks, all modern studies relate the change in the insiders' pro…ts to the change in the pro…ts of a control sample. The literature can be divided into two parts, depending on how the control sample is constructed. In some studies, the control sample consists of …rms from various industries (e.g. Meeks, 1977; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987) . In other studies, the control sample consists of …rms from the same industry as the merging …rms (e.g. Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992) . As it turns out, the construction of the control group is important for the results. Merging …rms perform signi…cantly worse than the control group in the studies including …rms from various industries. In contrast, when compared to control …rms from the same industry, the e¤ect of mergers is mainly insigni…cant, and in the cases where it is signi…cant, the results favor the merging sample (Bild, 1998) .
The latter methodology is likely to more e¢ciently control for external shocks since some shocks are industry speci…c. There is, however, also a problem with this methodology; since the …rms in the control group may compete with the insiders, they are exposed to externalities from the merger. If so, the change in relative pro…tability is a biased measure of the change in the insiders' pro…tability.
In particular, if there is a positive (negative) externality, the change in relative 22 An interesting area for future research is to also explore the other possibility, i.e. that the administrative delay is short, and that event-studies thus do capture the direct e¤ects of the shocks. Such a model could be used for comparing the equilibrium when the shock is anticipated by the stock market and when the shock comes as a surprise. Potentially, one might also investigate which of all hypotheses (long versus short administrative delay; surprise versus anticipation) is favored by the empirical evidence. pro…tability under-estimates (over-estimates) the change in pro…tability, a bias of crucial importance for interpreting the empirical literature. In fact:
Proposition 3 Unpro…table mergers occurring in equilibrium increase the insiders' pro…ts in relation to the pro…t of the outsider.
The proof is straightforward. Consider region D where unpro…table mergers may occur. Before the merger, the insiders' relative pro…tability is ¼ (3) =¼ (3) = 1 and after the merger, it is
Proposition 3 provides a potential explanation why the results in accounting pro…t studies are sensitive to the choice of control group. Proposition 3 also shows that an increase in the pro…ts relative to other …rms in the same industry should not be taken as proof that a merger creates value.
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Bear in mind, however, that we illustrate the bias problem in an extreme way.
We assume that the control sample consists of the outsider only, and we have not formally included external shocks in the model. In reality, the attractiveness of including …rms from the same industry in the control sample depends on the relative strength of externalities and external shocks, and the extent to which external shocks are industry speci…c. The important conclusion is that one must be careful when constructing the control group. If possible, one should avoid controlling for external shocks by using …rms likely to be exposed to an externality from the merger, for example …rms active in both the same product market and the same geographical market. 23 Quite a few studies …nd a negative (but insigni…cant) e¤ect of mergers, as compared to …rms in the same industry (e.g. some country studies in Mueller, 1980 ). In our model, the only mergers that occur in equilibrium and reduce relative pro…ts are those in area B of Figure  1 . Hence, in equilibrium, if a merger reduces the insiders' pro…ts in relation to that of the outsider, it is a pro…table merger. Thus, according to this model, if a merger reduces pro…ts in relation to competitors, the merger should be concluded to be pro…table and not unpro…table, as is usually the case. This result indicates that the negative impact of mergers on pro…ts may have been overstated.
Why Targets Take it All
The event study literature shows that targets capture the whole stock market surplus from mergers. Our next goal is to show how the preemptive merger mechanism can explain such an unequal split of the surplus.
The essential element of the preemptive merger mechanism is that …rms compete to buy other …rms. Still, we have not captured the full intensity of the bidding competition occurring in reality. When two …rms bid for the same …rm, the target will choose the most favorable o¤er and, as a result, a Bertrand-like competition may arise. In contrast, we have assumed that targets only receive one of the o¤ers tendered by the other …rms. Moreover, the o¤ers are randomly selected with equal probability, independent of the magnitude of the bid. As a result, the model predicts that targets only receive their reservation values and, thus, that the buyer takes the whole surplus, which is at odds with the empirical evidence. 24 In this section, we discuss a variation of the model, allowing for the full intensity of bidding competition. This is not a trivial extension, however, since a very high target premium creates a strong disincentive for …rms to bid and, as a consequence, a strong disincentive for mergers. Therefore, it is not obvious that mergers giving the target the whole surplus can occur in equilibrium. In fact, our analysis shows that pure strategy equilibria fail to exist due to this disincentive to merge.
The revised model is di¤erent in one respect only. We now distinguish between non-competing bids (two bids for di¤erent targets) and competing bids (two bids for the same target). Essentially, we assume that among competing bids, only the highest bids are transmitted, an assumption capturing the fact that a target receiving two bids will choose the highest one. 25 It turns out that we now need to explicitly allow …rms to randomize over di¤erent bids for an equilibrium to exist. A symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized by the triple (a; p; F (b)), where F (b) denotes the cumulative distribution of bids, given that a …rm submits a bid. Note that there are two opposing forces determining the optimal bid. A high bid increases the target premium, while a low bid increases the risk of becoming an outsider.
The equilibrium structure of this model is similar to the basic model. The only interesting di¤erence is the size of the bids. When it is better to be an insider than an outsider, the bids are distributed over an interval, £ W (3) ; b ¤ . The equilibrium bid distribution balances the already mentioned two opposing forces, making all bids in the interval equally pro…table. Since the bid is always larger than W (3), the target's stock market value is always increased. Moreover, the buyer's stock market value both increases and decreases with positive probability. In fact:
Proposition 4 If it is better to be an insider than an outsider, the combined stock market value of the merging …rms increases, as does the stock market value of the target …rm. In expectation, the stock market value of the buying …rm is una¤ected.
The proof of Proposition 4 is to be found in Fridolfsson and Stennek (2001) .
An immediate consequence of the Proposition is that the target receives the whole surplus in expectation, since the stock market value of the buying …rm is una¤ected in expectation. The intuition is the same as in Bertrand competition, although here, bidding competition eliminates the buyer's share of the surplus in expected terms. The signi…cance of this result is that it generates the stylized facts found in the event-study literature.
26 25 Formally, we can describe the transmission technology in the following way. The probability that a particular …rm j is selected as target in a certain period is equal to the number of bids submitted to j, divided by the total number of bids submitted in that period. Among the bids submitted to j, the highest bids are selected with equal probability. 26 There is a potential problem, however. The prediction is conditional on it being better to There exists a small literature on "preemptive takeover bidding" attempting to explain why bidders o¤er targets such a high premium. For example , Fishman (1988) argues that a …rst bidder may o¤er a high premium to signal a high private valuation of the target. Thus, a second bidder may be deterred from investing in costly information about the target and, hence, from submitting a competing bid.
Although our results have much in common, there are also important di¤erences;
in our model the identity of the target is endogenous, for example.
Policy Implications
The diverging empirical evidence on M&A performance has created a controversy regarding the bene…ts of merger control. The results of the present paper, however, indicate that the empirical evidence does not support very strong policy conclusions.
Is antitrust costly for shareholders? Since event studies indicate that mergers increase the combined stock market value of the merging …rms, Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that "antitrust opposition to takeovers imposes substantial costs on the stockholders of merging …rms". The preemptive merger hypothesis, however, shows that increasing share prices are consistent with the merger reducing the …rms' pro…tability. If antitrust could consistently block mergers motivated by preemption, shareholders would be better o¤.
Is antitrust good for consumers? Since anti-competitive mergers raise outsiders' pro…ts, it has been argued that they should also raise their stock market values. Surprisingly, however, event studies indicate that even mergers challenged by antitrust authorities do not increase competitors' share prices. Based on this be an insider than an outsider. If this condition is not satis…ed, the stock market values of the target and the acquiring …rms are not a¤ected. Fortunately, the condition in Proposition 4 can be identi…ed empirically. It is straightforward to show that if it is better to be an insider than an outsider, the stock market value of the outsider is reduced. If, on the other hand, it is better to be an outsider than an insider, this value is increased.
evidence, Eckbo and Wier (1985) argue that "all but the 'most overwhelmingly large' mergers should be allowed to go forward". However, in Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000b) Preemptive mergers may even increase social welfare.
27
Should antitrust authorities neglect the e¤ect of mergers on the merging …rms' pro…ts? Farrell and Shapiro (1990) argue that the authorities may not need to check that mergers are privately pro…table; since the merger is proposed, it must be pro…table. The competition authorities can concentrate on evaluating the e¤ects of mergers on consumers and competitors. If the externalities are also 27 Consider the Cournot model in footnote 7. If, for example, c = 0:5 and f = 0:22, there is a preemptive merger equilibrium. Moreover, it is easy to verify that social welfare, de…ned as the sum of consumers' surpluses and producers' pro…ts, is increased by such a merger.
positive, the merger is socially desirable. However, the empirical …ndings that pro…t ‡ows are often reduced cast doubts on the foundations of this recommendation. In order to address this concern, however, we need to understand why unpro…table mergers take place. Some explanations of unpro…table mergers rely on the assumption that the owners of the …rms lack the instruments to discipline their managers, and that managers consistently overestimate their abilities (Roll, 1986) , or that managers are motivated by a desire to build a corporate empire (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) . If the hubris or the empire-building explanations are correct, the externality approach may be appropriate. Rather, improvements in the owners' ability to control their management are warranted. The preemptive merger hypothesis, on the other hand, depicts pro…t ‡ow reductions as a result of the competitive forces in the product market, which opens up for a discussion of whether competition policy should be used for preventing privately unpro…table mergers. In our view there are important objections to such a policy, however.
Unpro…table mergers may systematically be good for consumers and, potentially, also for social welfare. Moreover, antitrust authorities may not have the expertise required to perform such a task.
Concluding Remarks
We demonstrate a preemptive (or defensive) merger mechanism that may explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce pro…ts and raise share prices. In Fridolfsson and Stennek (2000b) , we also demonstrate why mergers may reduce competitors' share prices even though their pro…ts increase (as, for example, in an anti-competitive merger). These results may be reformulated as a critique of the empirical literature on mergers.
We have demonstrated that mergers may a¤ect the value of …rms (the sum of expected discounted pro…ts) and pro…ts in opposite directions. If the stock market understands merger dynamics, the change in the …rms' stock market values re ‡ects the change in their true values. If, on the other hand, the merger comes as a surprise, the change in the …rms' stock market values re ‡ects the change in their pro…tability. Hence, to understand the informational contents of share prices, it is essential for future event studies to empirically discriminate between the e¢cient market (anticipation) hypothesis and the surprise hypothesis.
We have shown that the current practice to control for external shocks by measuring M&A performance relative to the performance of …rms in the same industry, may produce biased estimates. The reason is that mergers confer externalities on, for example, competitors. Finding other methods of controlling for external shocks is an important challenge for future empirical work. A minimum requirement is that one must be careful not to control for external shocks by including …rms likely to be exposed to an externality from the merger (e.g. competitors) in the control sample.
Some empirical studies of M&A performance use share price data, while others use accounting pro…ts. In the past, the two types of data have been viewed as substitutes. However, our results indicate that these data are complements.
Relying on share prices only, it may not be detected that unpro…table mergers occur; relying on accounting pro…ts only, the reasons why they occur may not be detected. 28 Hence, in future empirical work, it is desirable to integrate the two types of data.
Similarly, we have demonstrated the importance of externalities for …rms' incentives to merge. Hence, in future empirical work, it is desirable to integrate data on insiders and outsiders. One possibility is to classify mergers (with reference to Figure 1 ) as type B, C, or D (and perhaps even as type A). Such an approach would also be crucial for testing the preemptive merger hypothesis. In particular, there are some residual implications of the hypothesis that can be useful for further testing, namely that outsiders lose in terms of pro…ts as well as share prices, both in absolute and in relative terms.
The value of remaining in status quo is multiplied by the probability that no other …rm bids (m = 0), which is the only case where the triopoly (n = 3) persists. The value of being an outsider is multiplied by [1 ¡ Pr fm = 0g] ¡ n¡2 n¡1 ¢ , that is, the probability that at least one …rm bids and that this bid is not for i.
B The Equilibrium Structure
Lemma 1 Consider the symmetric Markov perfect equilibria as ¢ ! 0. A nomerger equilibrium exists if, and only if, ¼ (2 
There exist no other symmetric Markov perfect equilibria as ¢ ! 0. We start the proof by rewriting the de…nitions of W (3), EV B and EV NB.
Let ± = e ¡r¢ . Substitute (2a)-(2c) into (3) and solve for W (3):
Note that by Lemma 2, when p > 0 and n = 3,
Note also that
ª . By equations (8) and (9), we thus have:
Now we analyze immediate-, no-and delayed-merger equilibria.
30 Actually, a delayed merger equilibrium also exists in the non-generic case when ¼ (2
(the intersection of the two lines in Figure 1 ). In this case, any p 2 (0; 1=2) is a (delayed) equilibrium. Unless p ! 0 as ¢ ! 0, the merger will occur (almost) immediately.
An immediate-merger equilibrium is characterized by p = 1=2. By equation (4), we have q = 1=6. By equation (10), we have
when ¢ ! 0 (that is, ± ! 1). By equation (11) 
A no-merger equilibrium is characterized by p = 0. By equation (4) A delayed-merger equilibrium is characterized by p 2 (0; 1=2). Use equation
(1) to eliminate W (2 i ) in equation (10). Use equation (4) to eliminate q. Then:
where´is de…ned in Lemma 4. Use equations (2a (12) and (13) respectively. Use equilibrium condition (6) to eliminate b and equation (1) to eliminate W (2 i ). Equate EV B and EV NB and solve for W (3):
where » is de…ned in Lemma 3. Equations (14) and (15) Second, assume that ¼ (3) < ¼ (2 + ) =2 < ¼ (2 ¡ ). By analyzing the slopes and intercepts of K (p) and H (p; ±), it is once more easy to show that equations (14) and (15) 
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By analyzing the slopes and intercepts of K (p) and H (p; ±) in each case, it is once more easy to show that equations (14) and (15) have no solutions.
C Additional Lemmata
Lemma 2 Let m » Bin (n ¡ 1; (n ¡ 1) p). When p > 0,
When p = 0, E © 1 m+1 ª = 1.
Proof: See Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) . 31 In this proof, we do not treat the non-generic pro…t con…gurations given by the two lines in Figure 1 (that is, ¼ (2 + ) = 2¼ (3) or ¼ (2 + ) = 2¼ (2 ¡ )). Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) provide a proof for these cases. For all ± 2 (0; 1),´(0; ±) = 0,´(1=2; ±) = ±=3, and´(p; ±) is monotonically increasing in p. Moreover, lim ±!1´( p; ±) = 1=3 for all p > 0, so that´(p; ±) is ¡-shaped as ± ! 1.
Proof: The two …rst properties follow immediately from the de…nition of´(p; ±). since ± < 1. Finally, note that for all p > 0, lim ±!1´( p; ±) =´(p; 1) = 1=3.
